Abstract. We study the modal properties of intuitionistic modal logics that belong to the provability logic or the preservativity logic of Heyting Arithmetic. We describe thefragment of some preservativity logics and we present fixed point theorems for the logics iL and iP L, and show that they imply the Beth property. These results imply that the fixed point theorem and the Beth property hold for both the provability and preservativity logic of Heyting Arithmetic. We present a frame correspondence result for the preservativity principle W p that is related to an extension of Löb's principle.
Introduction
In this paper 1 we study some intuitionistic modal logics that arise from a specific mathematical interpretation of the modal operations. The modalities we consider are and , and their interpretation is given by ϕ "ϕ is provable in HA", i.e. HA ϕ ϕ ψ "for all σ ∈ Σ 1 : HA σ → ϕ implies HA σ → ψ", where HA is Heyting Arithmetic, the constructive counterpart of PA, i.e. it is a theory in intuitionistic predicate logic IQC that has as axioms the nonlogical axioms of PA, and Σ 1 is the first level of the arithmetical hierarchy. All the logics we consider are part of the provability or preservativity logic of HA. This means that all these logics consist of propositional schemes that HA proves about the provability predicate HA or the preservativity predicate HA of HA. In particular, the theorems of these logics are (constructively) valid schemes. Note that provability logic is part of preservativity logic, as
HA
HA ϕ ≡ HA ϕ. Preservativity logic was introduced by Visser[2002] as a constructive alternative for interpretability logic, to which it is equivalent for many classical theories, in particular for PA. No axiomatization is known for the preservativity logic of HA, but over the last few years at least part of the logic has been axiomatized 2 . It is a logic in the language of preservativity logic, L , i.e. the language of propositional logic extended with one binary modal operator . L is the language of provability logic, i.e. the language of propositional logic extended with one modal operator . As mentioned above, in preservativity logic we can define A as A. In this paper we consider the following principles of the preservativity logic of HA ( and bind stronger than ∧, ∨, that bind stronger than →). iP − denotes the logic given by IPC, the principles P 1, P 2, and the rules P res and M P . iP is the logic iP − extended by Dp and is called the basic preservativity logic for reasons explained in the next section. By iP 4 we denote the logic iP extended by the principle 4p. Similarly for the other preservativity principles Lp, M p, W p. iK denotes the logic given by IPC, K, and the rules N ec and M P . The logic iK extended by the principle 4 is denoted by iK4. Similarly for L, Le. Conform tradition, iKL is denoted by iL. iLLe denotes iL extended by Le. iP X denotes an arbitrary extension of iP . Lemma 1.1 below shows that all provability principles can be derived from the preservativity principles.
Readers familiar with provability logic will note that at the right side the non-logical axioms K, 4, L of the provability logic GL of PA are listed. This in contrast to Dp and Le, that do not belong to the preservativity logic of PA. Since it is difficult to think of a natural classical interpretation of or for which these principles would hold, they are not likely to appear in classical modal logic. On the classical side, the modal study of the provability logic of PA has been a useful tool, as it was shown in Solovay [1976] that for a formula A(p 1 , . . . , p n ) not derivable in GL one can construct, on the basis of a countermodel of A, arithmetical formulas ϕ i such that PA A(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ), (where in A are interpreted as the provability predicate of PA). An analogous result holds for the interpretability (preservativity) logic of PA. Although it is open whether similar results hold for HA, the modal study of the principles above is interesting for two main reasons. First, these principles express principles of HA. Therefore, knowledge about them is likely to provide insights in HA, and might help in the search for a complete axiomatization of the provability and preservativity logic of HA. In fact, modal results have lead to new principles of these logics before. Second, as mentioned above, some of these principles do not belong to the logics regularly studied in intuitionistic modal logic. We think that therefore the modal study of these principles might be a valuable addition to the field.
In Iemhoff[2003] modal completeness results were presented for all logics given by some or all of these principles, except for iP W and iP L. In this paper we continue the modal study of these logics by investigating the relation between the preservativity and provability logics (Section 3), and by presenting fixed point theorems for both iP L and iL (Section 4). From the latter it follows that both the fixed point theorem and the Beth property hold for any extension of these logics in the appropriate language. In particular, it follows that they hold for the provability and preservativity logic of HA. The proof of the fixed point theorem for iP L also provides another proof of the fixed point theorem for the interpretability logic IL. Furthermore, we present a correspondence theorem for iP W and explain the connection of this principle to iP L. It is not difficult to show that W p is derivable in iP LM , so in view of the preservativity logic of HA it does not add anything new. However, this principle came up in Zhou [2003] in relation to the open problem of frame completeness for iP L, where it plays an interesting role. This will be explained in more detail in Section 3.4 on W p.
-fragments
The first part (Section 3) on the relation between preservativity and provability logics, needs a little more explanation. The -fragment of a preser-vativity logic iP X in L is defined to be
Here we ask ourselves what the -fragment of a given preservativity logic is. An obvious relation between and is given by the following lemma 3 .
Now the guiding idea behind the description of the -fragments is the translation • on formulas that inductively replaces all occurrences of A B by A → B. All preservativity principles except Dp, M p and W p are derivable in iL under this translation 4 . For W p, it is explained in Section 3.4. why its translation under • does not belong to the provability logic of HA. For Dp and M p, the translation of which under • does not belong to the provability logic of HA either 5 , it turns out that there are rules that somehow cover the effect of Dp and M p on the -fragment of the preservativity logics that contain them. These are the rules
We show that for all preservativity logics considered in this paper, these rules determine the -fragment of a preservativity logic in the following way. theorem 1.2. (Numbers indicate the sections where the equality is proved.)
In all these cases the general method to prove these equalities is similar. As an example, we explain the way in which the equalities on the second line iP 4 = iLe = iK4 + DR are proved. First it is shown that iP 4 = iLe, essentially by proving completeness of iLe and iP 4 with respect to the same class of frames. As iLe ⊆ iK4 + DR, this gives
It remains to prove that
Since by Lemma 1.1 it follows that iP 4 4, it suffices to show that DR is admissible for iP 4 . This is shown via proving that the rule BP (Box Pres)
is admissible for iP X, i.e. iP X+BP = iP X, and then applying the following lemma. lemma 1.3. If the rule BP is admissible for iP X, then DR is admissible for iP X, and whence for iP X . If in addition iP X M p, then both DR and M oR are admissible for iP X, and whence for iP X .
Proof. We show the first part of the lemma, as the second part is similar. Suppose iP X A → B. By the admissibility of BP this implies that iP X A B. Since iP derives Dp, so does iP X.
All the other equalities are proved in a similar manner. However, the applied techniques differ with the logic. In some cases modal completeness results are used, but for iP L, for which such a result is not available, other methods had to be found.
Preliminaries and Tools

Semantics for Preservativity Logic
definition 2.1. A frame F (for preservativity logic) is a triple W, R, ≤ , where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, points or nodes, ≤ is a partial order and R is a binary relation satisfying
A model M is a quadruple W, R, ≤, where W, R, ≤ is a frame and is a forcing relation between points in W and propositional letters which satisfies the following condition:
• (persistence) If x p and x ≤ y, then y p.
Next we model the whole language by extending the forcing relation to relate points to complex formulae by interpreting the connectives in IP C in the usual manner:
for any w;
M, w ⊥ for any w. Define ¬A as A → ⊥. From the above third and fifth clauses and the definition of ¬A as A → ⊥, it is easy to deduce that M, w ¬A iff ∀v ≥ w(M, v A). The most important and characteristic clause is the following one for formulas:
It follows immediately that M, w A iff for any v such that wRv, M, v A. Also it is easy to check that
• (persistence for all formulas) for any formula A in L , if M, w A and w ≤ v, then M, v A.
As a matter of fact, given the persistence for propositional letters, the condition that (≤ • R) ⊆ R is a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee persistence for all formulas 6 , which is different from the condition (≤ • R) ⊆ (R • ≤) for intuitionistic modal logic (sometimes we write R • ≤ asR). lemma 2.2. Let W, R, ≤ be a frame such that W is a non-empty set, ≤ is a partial order and (≤ •R) ⊆ R. Then there is a formula A of L and a forcing relation such that in W, R, ≤, for some x, y ∈ W , x ≤ y and x A but y A.
Proof. Since not (≤ •R) ⊆ R, there are two worlds x, y ∈ W such that x(≤ •R)y but not xRy. That is to say, there is a world u ∈ W such that x ≤ uRy. Define z p iff y ≤ z; z q iff z ≤ y; z r for any other propositional letter r. It is easy to check that is a forcing relation, i.e. it satisfies that for any propositional letter t, if x ≤ y and x t, then y t. On one hand, u p q. For uRy, y p, y q and hence u p q. On the other hand, x p q. To see this we shall show that if xRz and z p, then z q. Since xRz, z = y. Moreover, y ≤ z, for z p. Therefore y < z. This implies that z ≤ y and hence z q. So we get that x ≤ u, x p q but u p q.
A is valid in a model M if for any w ∈ W M, w A. A is valid in a frame F if A is valid on any model M = F, on the frame. theorem 2.3. iP A iff A is valid on all frames iff A is valid on all finite frames. 7 As we can easily see, iP stands in the same position in preservativity logic as iK does in normal modal logics. In this sense, it is the basic preservativity logic.
Semantics for Intuitionistic Provability Logic
The semantics for L should be part of the semantics for L because we define A to be A. Although, given the persistence for propositional letters, the condition that (≤ •R) ⊆ (R• ≤) is a sufficient and necessary condition that guarantee the persistence for all formulas in L (in fact (≤ •R) ⊆ R implies (≤ •R) ⊆ (R• ≤)), it is well justified 8 to define frames for intuitionistic provability logics in the following simpler way, which is the same as that of frames for preservativity logics. definition 2.4. A frame F (for intuitionistic provability logic) is a triple W, R, ≤ where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, points or nodes, ≤ is a partial order and R is a binary relation satisfying
However, for L we can impose extra conditions on frames that we cannot require of frames for preservativity logic. All intuitionistic modal logics iT that we will consider below are complete with respect to some class of frames satisfying additionally:
In particular, iK is complete w.r.t the class of finite brilliant frames. Moreover, all the notions and propositions above can be adapted into intuitionistic modal logic automatically. We will not go into details about that.
Some Useful Facts
In the following we achieve some basic propositions in preservativity logics that will be very useful to other sections in this paper. First we establish the connection between the natural rule for preservativity logic: preservation rule and the more-often-used rule: necessitation rule. theorem 2.5. In any preservativity logic iT containing all theorems in iP − , the preservation rule and the necessitation rule are equivalent. 9 Proof. Assume that A → B/A B is admissible in iT and iT A.
By the preservation rule, we get that iT A, i.e iT A. Now for the other direction. Assume that the necessitation rule is admissible in iT and iT A → B. By applying the necessitation rule, we get that iT (A → B). It follows from Lemma 1.1 that iT A B.
By Lemma 1.1, we immediately get the following two corollaries: corollary 2.6. The following two forms of the M p principle are equivalent over iP − :
corollary 2.7. The following two forms of W are equivalent over iP − :
We will use the following substitution lemmas in our section on the fixed point theorems.
Proof. We can prove (a) directly by induction on the complexity of F , and (b) by induction from (a).
The following lemma, the proof of which we leave to the reader, shows that the principle 4 is a very basic principle in intuitionistic provability logic.
Conservation Results
As you will see, the rule A → B/A B plays a dominant role in the following sections. This rule is discussed in Section 5.2 of Iemhoff [2001] where a short proof sketch is given for the admissibility of the rule for iP H. We will give detailed proofs of the admissibility of this rule in many other logics, which may impose an impression that we repeat the same proofs. This is not the case though. Every time we show the admissibility for a different logic, you will find some additional new ideas in the proof. We will divide the presentation of this section into several parts according to the results which we have previously mentioned.
Conservation of iP 4 over iLe
A notational convention: Given a frame M , [z) := {w| there is a sequence of w 0 S 0 w 1 · · · w n = w for some worlds w 0 , w 1 , · · · , w n in M where S i ∈ {R, ≤}}. Thus [z) stands for the subframe generated by z. The same notation applies to models.
2. In L , iK4 A iff A is valid on all finite transitive frames.
3. The principle 4p corresponds to gatheringness: if wRvRu, then v ≤ u.
iP 4
A iff A is valid on all finite gathering frames.
5. On finite frames Le corresponds to the Le-property: ∀wv(wRv → ∃x(wRx ≤ v ∧ ∀u(vRu → x ≤ u))).
6. iLe A iff A is valid on all finite brilliant Le-frames.
7. In L , iLLe A iff A is valid on all finite transitive conversely wellfounded brilliant Le-frames.
For the sake of completeness, we will repeat the conservation of iP 4 over iLe in Iemhoff [2001] to give a more transparent presentation. Besides, we need again the procedure (used in Lemma 3.3) transforming Le-frames to gathering frames again in the proofs of Lemmas 3.11 and 3.34. S(x) denotes the property: ∀u(xRu → x ≤ u). Assume that wRv. We need to find an x such that wR x ≤ v. That is to say, wRx ≤ v and S(x). By the Le-property, there is a successor x 1 of w which is below both v and all its own successors. If x 1 = v, then we have found such an x. If x 1 = v, then there is another successor x 2 of w which is below both x 1 and all its own successors. If x 2 = x 1 , then we have found such an x. If not, we will repeat the same argument as above. Thus, we will get a sequence x 1 x 2 · · · . Since the frame is finite, there are two nodes x n−1 = x n for some n; x n is the x that we are looking for.
Proof. Observe that, by 4p and Dp, iP 4 (A ∨ B) (A ∨ B), and apply Lemma 1.1. theorem 3.5. iLe A iff A is valid on all finite gathering frames.
Proof. The right-to-left direction follows from the fact that Le is derivable in iP 4 (Lemma 3.4). We just need to show the other direction. Suppose that iLe A. Then by the completeness of iLe, we know that there is a world b in some finite brilliant Le model M = W, R, ≤, such that M, b A. According to Lemma 3.3, there is another new finite gathering model
3.1.1. iLe is equivalent to the logic iK4 with DR lemma 3.7. Let M be a model on a gathering frame and x, y be two worlds in this model such that xRy. If y A, then, for any z ∈ [y), z A.
Proof. First one observation: for any z ∈ [y), y ≤ z. This follows immediately from the fact that M is on a gathering frame. So z A. Take any successor w of z, w A because w ∈ [y). So z A and hence z A.
Proof. The direction from left to right follows from Lemma 1.1. We prove the other direction by contraposition. Suppose that iP 4 A B. From the completeness of iP 4, it follows that A B is false at a point w of some finite gathering model M . Then there is a point v such that wRv, v A and v B. Now we define from the original one a new model M , which is, in fact, a submodel of the old one. Take W := {w} ∪ [v), R = R W , ≤ =≤ W , and x p iff x p for any propositional variable p, for all x ∈ W . Observe that M has a gathering frame. Note that, for any x ∈ [v) and for any formula
It is clear that M , w B because wR v and M , v B. By the above lemma, we get that M , w
theorem 3.9. iLe is equivalent to the logic iK4 with the extra rule DR.
Proof. First we prove that iLe is contained in iK4 + DR. We only need to show that Le is derivable in the latter logic. Since iK4 + DR A → A, we can get Le immediately by just applying DR. For the other direction, recall 11 that the principle 4 is derivable in iLe. Whence it remains to show that DR is admissible for iLe, which is the same as showing that it is admissible for iP 4 , by Corollary 3.6. That DR is admissible for iP 4 follows from the previous lemma, by applying Lemma 1.3.
3.2. Conservation of iP L over iLLe lemma 3.10. The principle Lp corresponds to gatheringness plus converse well-foundedness of the modal relation. Similarly, L corresponds to semitransitivity plus well-foundedness. 12 lemma 3.11. iLLe A iff A is valid on all finite gathering conversely wellfounded frames.
Proof. First the easier left-to-right direction. It suffices to show that both Le and L are valid on all finite gathering conversely well-founded frames. Firstly, Le is valid on all finite gathering frames and hence on all finite gathering conversely well-founded frames. Secondly, L is valid on all finite gathering conversely well-founded frames. For L corresponds to semi-transitivity plus converse well-foundedness, and gatheringness implies semi-transitivity.
Next we show the more difficult direction. Suppose that iLLe A where A is a formula in L . According to Theorem 3.1, there is a point b in some model M = W, ≤, R, which is finite transitive conversely wellfounded brilliant Le-model such that M, b A. Define wR v iff wRv and ∀u(vRu → v ≤ u). By the same argument as that in Lemma 3.3, we get that R ⊆ R ⊆ (R • ≤). Set M = W, R , ≤, . It is easy to see that M is on a finite gathering frame, as we impose this property through the definition of R .
Finally, M is conversely well-founded. Suppose not. Then there is a loop: w 0 R w 1 R · · · R w n R w 0 . According to the definition of R , w 0 Rw 1 R · · · Rw n Rw 0 , which is impossible because R is conversely well-founded. So M is on a finite gathering well-founded frame. It follows immediately from 11 Lemma 2.9 12 Iemhoff [2001] . the above Lemma 3.2 that M , b A. Since M is on a finite gathering conversely well-founded frame, A is not valid on all finite gathering conversely well-founded frames.
Proof. Suppose that iLLe A. Then A is not valid on all gathering conversely well founded frames. It follows from the above correspondence result that iP L A. On the other hand, it is easy to see that iLLe is contained in iP L. For both L and Le are derivable in iP L.
iLLe is Equivalent to iL with the Extra Rule DR
In the following paragraphs we are mainly concerned with the proof of
which immediately implies that iLLe is equivalent to iL with the extra rule DR.
Proof. Let C range over expressions ((
Then the above proposition can be put in the following simpler way:
iP L A iff there exists C such that iP 4 C → A.
The direction from right to left is obvious. We just show the other direction. Assume that iP L A. Let s 1 s 2 · · · s n be a proof of A in iP L, i.e. s n = A and for all i ≤ n, s i is an axiom of iP L, or there are j, h < i such that s j s h / s i is an instance of Modus Ponens, or s j / s h is an instance of the rule P res. 
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 3.8.
Then, according to Lemma 3.15, there are some instances of L:
. By Lemma 3.16, we get that iP 4 C → (A B). This implies, according to Lemma 3.15 , that iP L A B. corollary 3.18. iLLe is equivalent to the logic iL with the extra rule DR. Whence iP L = iLLe = iL + DR.
Proof. The previous theorem, Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 1.3.
In fact, we can show the admissibility of DR in iLLe without that of A → B/A B in iP L. The proof strategy here is similar to the above though. First we give a similar detour lemma: lemma 3.19. For any formula A in L , iLLe A iff iLe C → A where C is the conjunction of some instances of Löb's principle L.
Proof. Here we only mention that, for any instance C of Löb's provability principle, iLLe C ↔ C. theorem 3.20. DR is admissible in iLLe.
Conservation of iP M over iK
Before proving that iK is the L -fragment of iP M (Theorem 3.29), we show the admissibility of A → B/A B. Recall thatR is short for R• ≤. lemma 3.21. 13 (i) The principle M p corresponds to the M p property:
It is not easy to give a precise proof of the admissibility of rules in iP M , although the intuitive idea is not difficult. Probably the reason for that lies in the fact that the M p property is a property that states the existence of certain nodes. Hence, in contrast to the situation for e.g. gathering models, the M p property is not inherited by submodels. In order to make certain submodels into models that have the M p property, we have to define some notions to help with our formalization of the proof. 1. If x ≤ y, then yR ⊆ xR. Therefore, if x ≤ y and xR ⊆ yR, then yR = xR.
2. Let (w, v, u) and (w, v , u) be two problems. If (w, v, u) (w, v , u) and x is a solution to the problem (w, v , u), then x is also a solution to the problem (w, v, u).
5. Let F be a frame. If there is no unsolved problem, then F satisfies the M p-property. 
First we define
where w is a new world. Then enumerate all the elements in min[v 0 ]: u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u n . The purpose of choosing minimal points is to just to make the construction more efficient. At every stage we will add solution to some indispensable unsolved problems. These solutions will be denoted by x σ , where σ is a sequence of nodes in W 0 , used to keep track of the problem to which x σ is a solution. Let * denote concatenation of sequences, and let σ l denote the last element of σ, i.e. y 0 , . . . , y m l = y m , and τ σ denote that τ is an initial segment of σ. Let T C(S) denote the reflexive transitive closure of a relation S. At stage 0, we add for every unsolved problem (w, v 0 , u i ) (which is indispensable because the u i are minimal elements), a new world x u i to W 0 . We define the new frame
It is easy to see that x u i R = u iR and that we can extend the forcing relation to the new nodes by defining x u i p iff u i p for all propositional letters. Note that in this way persistency is satisfied.
Observe that in F 1 all indispensable unsolved problems are of the form (w, x u i , z), for some z ∈< [u i ]. Namely, all the problems (w, v 0 , u i ) and (w, x u i , u i ) have been solved by x u i , and all problems (w, v 0 , z) for z ∈< [u i ] have become dispensable in F 1 through x u i . Therefore, we have only to consider problems (w, x u i , z), for some z ∈< [u i ]. At stage 1, we add for every unsolved problem (w, x u i , u) with u ∈ min[u i ], a solution x u i ,u to W 1 , and proceed in the same way as before.
In general, at stage i + 1, we consider the nodes x σ in F i that are newly added at stage i. For every such x σ and every problem (w, x σ , u) for u ∈ min[σ l ] we add a solution x σ * u to W i . We define the new frame
Again, note that x σ * uR = uR and that by extending the forcing relation to the new nodes via x σ * u p iff u p, persistency is satisfied. To see that the procedure terminates, observe that for every x σ that is added at some stage in the construction, σ is of the form u i , y 1 , . . . , y m , for some nodes u i < y 1 < . . . < y m in W 0 . Since W 0 is finite, termination follows. Let i + 1 be a stage at which there are no more unsolved indispensable problems. Consider M i . As explained in the previous lemma, M i satisfies the M p-property. It remains to show that M i , w A and M i , w B, as according to the soundness of iP M , this gives iP M A → B. It is not difficult to prove with induction to i that for all formulas C,
for all nodes
We leave the proof to the reader. For the first part, use the fact that x σ * uR = uR. For the last part, use the first part and the facts that no new nodes are added above the u i , and that above v 0 all new nodes are of the form x σ . As observed above, for x σ * u , u ∈ W 0 and v 0 ≤ u. Thus u A, and whence M i , x σ * u A. Whence x σ A, for all x σ ∈ W i . As for w, wR i y implies y = v 0 or y is a new node x σ , it follows that M i , w A. M i , w B follows from the fact that M i , v 0 B.
We can extract a theorem from the above proof, which is very handy when we deal with the admissibility of many other rules in iP M . 2. for any world x ∈ [v) and any formula E, M, x E iff N, x E; 3. there is a world w ∈ W such that wR v and, if wR y and M, v A, then N, y A.
if M, v
A and M, v B, then there is a world w ∈ W such that w R v and N, w A → B.
By appealing to this theorem, we can easily show that iP M is also closed under the inference rules: A/A and A → B/ A → B.
theorem 3.26. The logic iK + DR + M oR is contained in iP M .
Proof. By Lemma 1.3 and Theorem 3.24.
There also is an interesting syntactic proof of iK +DR+M oR = iP M that uses the following translation on formulas which is related to the translation • given in the introduction.
definition 3.27. The translation * from formulas in L to those in L is inductively defined as follows:
• For p, and ⊥, p * = p, * = and ⊥ * = ⊥.
• For • ∈ {∨, ∧, →}, (A • B) * = A * • B * .
• (¬A) * = ¬A * .
• (A B) * = (A * → B * ).
Proof. Clearly, iK ⊆ iP X . Thus it remains to show that iP X ⊆ iK. Assume that iP X A. Of course we can consider A as a formula in L according to the fact that A ≡ ( A) in iP . It suffices to show that if iP X A, then iK A * ( * ) because, for any formula B in L , B * = B.
Since iP X A, there is a finite sequence
. either s i is in the forms of P 1 , P 2 , Dp or X,
or there are some
We treat the first case and leave the others to the reader. If s i is an instance of P 1 , P 2 , Dp or X, then it is easy to see that s * i is a theorem of iK for the first three, and it follows by assumption for X. theorem 3.29. iP M = iK = iK + DR + M oR. theorem 3.30. iP = iK.
Conservation of iP W Over iLLe
The usual method to prove completeness for L, like the proof method in the proof of completeness for iL, breaks down for iP L. One of the problems is that it is not possible in iP L to infer A B from A ∧ B B 14 . This is how the principle W p emerged. Trivially, Lp is derivable in IP W . We do not know whether W p is complete, but in the following we will give a correspondence result for W p and show that the -fragment of iP W is iLLe. Thus although iP W and iP L are distinct, their -fragments are equal. ∀wvu(wRvRu → ∃x(wRx ∧ v < x ≤ u)). definition 3.32. Let W, R be a finite, transitive, gathering and conversely well-founded (hence irreflexive) frame. An end point w is a world without a w such that wRw or w ≤ w . It is easy to see that for any w ∈ W , there is a finite sequence s of w n , w n−1 , · · · , w 0 such that w = w n S n w n−1 · · · S 1 w 0 where s i is either R or ≤ and w 0 is an end point. We define the grade g s (w) of w in this sequence inductively as follows: theorem 3.33. iP W A implies that A is valid on all finite gathering, transitive and conversely well-founded frames.
Proof. It suffices to show that W p is valid on all finite gathering, transitive, conversely well-founded frames. Given a model M on such a frame W, R and any w , w, v ∈ W such that w ≤ wRv, assume that M, w (A∧ B The converse of this lemma is not true. On the one hand, it is easy to check that (A B) → (A B) is valid on all transitive frames. On the other hand, it is well-known that this formula is not arithmetically valid in HA. Suppose that the converse were true. Then, according to the converse proposition, iP W (A B) → (A B), which is impossible because W p is a valid principle in HA whereas (A B) → (A B) is not. lemma 3.34. iLLe A iff A is valid on all finite gathering transitive and conversely well-founded frames.
Proof. In fact the lemma is not new, just an extension of Lemma 3.11. We only need to show that transitivity is preserved in the new model N = W, R , ≤, V . Assume that w, v, u ∈ W and wR vR u. We need to show that wR u. Since wR vR u, wRvRu and hence wRu because R is transitive. It remains to show that, for any z such that uR z, u ≤ z. This immediately follows from the assumption that vR u. So wR u.
Proof. Since both L and Le are derivable in iP L, and iP W is a proper extension of iP L, iLLe ⊆ iP W is clear. For iP W ⊆ iLLe, suppose that iLLe A for some A in L . By the completeness of iLLe, we know that A is not valid on some finite transitive gathering and conversely wellfounded frame. It follows from Lemma 3.33 that iP W A. This shows that iP W = iLLe. That iLLe = iL + DR follows from Corollary 3.18.
Note that in contrast to the principles treated before,
. Using the completeneness result for iLLe one can show that (W p) • does not belong to iLLe, but one can also show directly that W p does not belong to the provability logic of HA, and whence cannot be derivable from iLLe. For if so, ( B → B) → B would belong to the provability logic as well, because it is derivable from W p. But this principle is not even true, neither classically nor constructively, as it constructively implies ¬¬( B ∨ B).
Fixed Points and Beth Definability
In this section we will prove the fixed point theorems for iL and iP L and point out connections with Beth's Definability Theorem. Let us remind the reader that fixed point theorems are of the form: for each formula A(p) in which p occurs only modalized, there exists a unique B not containing p such that B and A(B) are provably equivalent. The proof of the existence of fixed points in iL is an adaptation of the well-known proof of that property for GL; the proof of the existence of fixed points in iP L derives from the one for IL, the basic interpretability logic (de Jongh-Visser [1991] ). We will give the main steps of the proof but not all the details where these are sufficiently similar to the classical proofs. In the last subsection, we will discuss the interderivability between fixed points and Beth definability (Definition 4.21) in both intuitionistic provability and preservativity logics. This extends the work of Areces et al. [2000] (see also Hoogland[2001] , Ch. 5).
A notational convention: AB is the result of substitution of B for p in the formula Ap.
Proofs of the existence of fixed points for a system usually consist of proving the existence of fixed points for the basic formulas and proving an inductive step. For the inductive step for iP L, we can borrow the following theorem 17 , since its proof did not use classical logic. This means that for iL and iP L we can confine ourselves to proving the basic cases. 
Fixed Point Theorem for iP L
The following proof is similar to the one for interpretability logic in de Jongh-Visser [1991] . To put it more precisely, the fixed point for the formula A(p) B(p) in iP L is a kind of mirror image of that for the formula A(p) i B(p) in IL. This is not surprising since classically A(p) B(p) is equivalent to ¬B(p) i ¬A(p) in IL. Since the latter formula contains negations however the details of the intuitionistic proof ought not to be skipped. The crucial point is Theorem 4.8 which reflects E2 of de Jongh-Visser [1991] .
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, reason in iP L:
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7. Proof. For the left to right direction, reason in iP L as follows:
For the right to left direction, it suffices to show: Proof. This is just a combination of Lemmas 4.9. and 4.13.
We may consider boxed formulas to be defined of course, but we can also rely on the fact that the proof of fixed point theorem for such formulas in iP L is the same as that in iL.
We can get a symmetric form of the fixed point for Ap Bp. Proof. It has to be checked that Proof. Reason in iP W :
In other words, A B ∧ B ↔ A ∧ B . Therefore we can proceed in iP W as follows:
However, in iP L, we can't get such a simpler form. Consider the formula p q. Suppose that the fixed point for formulas Ap Bp were A B . Then q would be the fixed point of p q, i.e. iP L () ↔ q. It is easy to see that one direction is correct: iP L q → (). But for the other direction it is not difficult to construct a countermodel. Proof. Just use the translation discussed at the start of this subsection and note that the principle Dp (which, dually, is not available in IL) has not been used in the above proof. Clearly ILW can be treated similarly.
Beth Definability and Fixed Points
In the following, we will show for a general class of intuitionistic modal logics two theorems (Theorem 4.24 and Theorem 4.25) about the interderivability of the Beth property (Definition 4.22) and the fixed point property (Definition 4.23). The theorem applies to logics in an extended language as e.g. preservativity logics. The theorems and their proofs are an adaptation of the corresponding theorems and proofs of Areces et al. [2000] concerning interpretability logic.
The essential difference lies in an adaptation of Maximova's trick to obtain the Beth property from the existence of fixed points. The problem is of course that fixed points are there for formulas with p modalized only, and Beth's property is supposed to apply to all formulas. Maximova's trick (Maximova[1989] ) that was applied in the proof in Areces et al. [2000] relies on the fact that A(p, r) is equivalent to (A 1 (p, r)∧r)∨(A 2 (p, r)∧¬r) for some A 1 , A 2 with r modalized. But this presupposes the existence of a disjunctive normal form unavailable in intuitionistic logic. However (skipping thep from here onwards), A 2 is not used in the proof and the role of A 1 can be taken over by the formula arising from the substitution of for all the nonmodalized occurrences of r. It is easy to see that, for A 1 thus defined, A 1 (r) is modalized in r and thus iP L (r ↔ r ) → (A 1 (r) ↔ A 1 (r ) ). The following straightforward lemma about the relation between A(r) and A 1 (r) is all we need. • (uniqueness) L (r ↔ A(p, r)) ∧ (r ↔ A(p, r )) → (r ↔ r ).
We now state the theorems in a form that seems more perspicuous than the formulation in Areces et al. [2000] . The properties we require in our formulations for the logics L are clearly strong enough to ensure the properties of Areces et al. [2000] . (This is because, just as in the classical case, over iK4 the rule LR is equivalent to the axiom scheme of iL.) theorem 4.23. (From Beth Definability to Fixed Points) Let L be an intuitionistic logic with modal operators that extends iL and obeys the substition lemmas and for which the Beth theorem holds. Then L has the fixed point property.
Proof. It is easy to check that the proof for the classical case in Hoogland [2001] is intuitionistically acceptable. theorem 4.24. (From Fixed Points to Beth Definability) Let L be an intuitionistic logic with modal operators that extends iL and obeys the substition lemmas and for which the fixed point theorem holds. Then L has the Beth property.
Proof. Again, the proof is similar to that in Areces et al. [2000] . The only difference is that we will not use Maksimova's lemma (see in Hoogland [2001] ) to reduce arbitrary formulas to ones that are "largely modalized" but apply Lemma 4.20 directly.
We have shown the fixed point theorem for iL and iP L. Since any extension L of iL or iP L will have the fixed point property, it should also have the Beth property according to the above theorem. corollary 4.25. Let T be an extension of iL or iP L (of course in the appropriate language). Then T has the Beth property.
